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1 Introduction 
Delving deeper into the determinants of domestic private investment behaviour in the 
case of developing countries is crucial for our understanding of how private investment 
is driven in these countries. This is a timely issue in view of the current public debate on 
the need to mobilise all sources of development finance, both external and domestic, to 
attain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015.1  
 
There exists a vast literature, both theoretical and empirical, on the determinants of 
domestic private investment behaviour. The accelerator models of investment, originated 
mainly by Clark (1917) with further modifications by Chenery (1952) and Koyck (1954) 
assume that the desired capital stock at any point in time is a constant multiple of output at 
that time. In these models, investment is independent from the price of capital. This 
missing element in the accelerator model has been considered in depth by the ‘neoclassical 
model of investment’ developed mainly by Jorgenson (1971), Hall and Jorgenson (1967), 
Eisner and Nadiri (1968) and Bischoff (1971) among others.2 Both the accelerator and the 
neoclassical models of investment behaviour are output-based models. In sharp contrast to 
these models, Tobin’s Q-theory of investment attempts to explain investment behaviour in 
terms of portfolio balance (Tobin, 1969).3  
 
In the early models of investment behaviour, financial variables do not play a direct 
role. However, since the 1980s a number of studies have emerged, most of them at the 
firm level, suggesting that the potential investors may face credit rationing due to 
asymmetric information in financial markets, thus demonstrating the importance of 
financial variables in determining private investment. Likewise, the ‘hierarchy of 
finance’ models emphasise the importance of a firm’s internal cash flow. In sharp 
contrast to the neoclassical model, the ‘hierarchy of finance’ models suggest that a pool 
of firms is always resource constrained. Their investment expenditure is constrained by 
the availability of internally generated funds—see Fazzari and Athey (1987), Fazzari et 
al. (1988), Hoshi et al. (1991) and Bond and Meghir (1994), among others, regarding 
the role of financial variables under the asymmetric information assumption.  
 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Greenwald et al. (1984), on the other hand, show that 
credit rationing and loan market equilibrium may co-exist when financial markets suffer 
from the problem of asymmetric information. Thus, asymmetric information may play a 
fundamental role in the functioning of capital markets whereby it is the availability of 
                                                 
1 See UN Millennium Project (2005), Cheru and Bradford (2005) and Addison et al. (2005) among others 
for a recent discussion regarding the MDGs. 
2 Nickell (1978) provides a detailed discussion.  
3 When the market value of an additional unit of capital exceeds its replacement cost, a firm can raise its 
profit by investing. Within this context, it seems reasonable to assume that inefficient pricing in equity 
markets can affect investment. See also Abel and Blanchard (1986).   2
capital rather than its cost becomes crucial in the determination of private investment 
(Greenwald and Stiglitz 1990, and Calomiris and Hubbard 1990, also make this point).4  
 
The other explanation for credit rationing in financial markets is associated with the 
‘financial repression’ hypothesis of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) which 
mobilized a voluminous empirical literature in this area. The central message of this 
approach is the ‘complementarity’ between money and capital in developing 
countries—see Gibson and Tsakalotos (1994) for a comprehensive survey. A recent 
stream of theoretical and empirical analyses on the finance-growth nexus5 has tried to 
illuminate the path through which financial variables affect growth via their impact on 
total factor productivity growth and investment—see among others, King and Levine 
(1993a,b); Benhabib and Spiegel (2000); and Beck et al. (2000). 
 
Another strand of the literature pays particular attention to the role of uncertainty in 
domestic private investment. Different forms of uncertainty have been considered in the 
investment literature. They include uncertainty arising from investment irreversibility 
(see Bernanke 1983; Pindyck 1991; Bertola and Caballero 1994; Dixit 1992; Goldberg 
1993; Dixit and Pindyck 1994; Chirinko 1996; Abel and Eberly 1999),6 uncertainty 
related to economic instability (see Rodrik 1991; Kormendi and Meguire 1985; Cardoso 
1993; Bleaney 1996; and more recently Beaudry et al. 2001; and Serven 2003),7 and, 
finally uncertainty emanating from sociopolitical instability (see Pastor and Hilt 1993; 
Alesina and Perotti 1996; and more recently Campos and Nugent 2003). The possible 
‘crowding in’ or ‘crowding out’ outcomes regarding the relationship between public and 
private investment have also received considerable attention in the private investment 
literature. Representative studies include Blejer and Khan (1984); Aschauer (1989); 
Pradhan et al. (1990); Greene and Villanueva (1991); and Taylor (1991).  
 
Finally, yet another aspect of the private investment literature emphasises the role of 
external constraints such as debt stock and debt service in private investment in 
particular as far as developing countries are concerned. Indeed, the external debt 
position of a country may affect the level of private investment through a number of 
channels: high debt-service payments related to large external debt may reduce the 
available funds for investment since they divert foreign exchange away from the import 
of capital and intermediate goods. Furthermore, the debt burden imposes a sort of 
                                                 
4 Likewise, Chirinko and Schaller (1995) show the role of liquidity constraints in private investment 
behaviour and Capasso and Mavrotas (2003) on how information asymmetries in the credit market affect 
average capital productivity and economic growth. 
5  See Arestis and Demetriades (1997), Levine (1997), Rousseau (1998), Luintel and Khan (1999), 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001), and Wachtel (2004) among others for comprehensive surveys of this 
literature. 
6 See also Zeira (1987) on how investment can be affected by ‘structural uncertainty’, i.e. uncertainty that 
arises when the firm does not fully know its own profit function, which relates profits to capital stock. 
7 See also Fielding (1997) and Krishna et al. (2003) on uncertainty associated with the trade-investment 
nexus and Asteriou and Price (2005) for a recent empirical study on the interactions between uncertainty, 
investment and economic growth.   3
marginal tax by reducing expected return on investment; and finally, the debt burden 
affects the creditworthiness of the country by imposing restrictions to its access to 
future foreign credit to finance investment or trade—see  inter alia Borensztein (1990), 
Sachs (1989), Greene and Villanueva (1991) and more recently Chirinko and Schaller 
(1995) and Acosta and Loza (2005).  
Focus of paper 
An important issue that has been overlooked in the empirical literature, particularly in 
those studies focusing on cross-country analysis of private investment behaviour, 
concerns the issue of cross-country heterogeneity. It is well-known that countries differ 
in terms of their levels of real and financial development, public investment, levels and 
history of inflation, real interest rates, real exchange rates and the magnitudes of the size 
and burden of national debt. Countries also differ in their risk profile, a key factor for 
private investment decisions. Given this cross-country diversity amongst the 
fundamentals that drive private investment, we argue that the key parameters of private 
investment function are likely to be heterogeneous and country specific. For example, 
the effect of the scale variable (i.e. real per capita income) may be positive on private 
investment but the magnitude of its effect may depend on other considerations such as 
the level of inflation, real interest rate, financial development and/or the level of per 
capita income itself. Real income may have a weaker effect on private investment in 
highly inflationary countries and vice versa. Similar arguments can apply vis-à-vis other 
determinants of private investment.  
 
Hence, the aim of this paper is twofold. First, it models the private investment 
behaviour in a panel of 24 low-income and middle-income countries by explicitly 
allowing for the cross-country heterogeneity in the parameters of private investment 
function. Our empirical model (see equation 2 in Section 3) precisely captures such 
heterogeneity. Second, it addresses the issue of endogeneity in a rigorous way by 
employing, among others, the system GMM estimator. In so doing, the present paper 
makes a contribution vis-à-vis the extant empirical literature in this field. The paper also 
sheds further light on the crucial nexus between financial sector development and 
domestic private investment by explicitly modeling the effects of a series of financial 
sector development indicators on private investment.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with data issues and 
in Section 3 we discuss specification issues and the econometric methodology adopted 
in the paper. Empirical results are reported and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes the paper.  
2 Data   
Our sample consists of 24 low-income and middle-income countries (see Table 1). Data 
frequency is annual for a period of 20 years (1981-2000). We have an unbalanced panel   4
of 468 observations. We assemble a broad array of data series for our sample countries 
whereby a fairly general empirical model of private investment, which incorporates 
most arguments put forward by competing economic theories, can be specified and 
estimated. The theoretical literature (see sections 1 and 3) postulates that the main 
determinants of private investment ( ,
P
it I ) are real per capita income ( ,
p
it Y ), growth rate of 




), public (government) investment ( ,
G
it I ), levels of financial 
development ( , it FD ), real interest rate ( , it r ), real exchange rate ( , it rex ), variability of 
real exchange rate ( ,
d




it I , and  ,
G
it I  are extracted from Everhart and Sumlinski (2001).  Data on  , it B and 
, it BS  are extracted from the World Bank Global Development Finance database. We 
construct five indicators of financial development for each sample country. Four of 
them viz., LLY (ratio of liquid liability of the financial system to GDP), PRIVATE 
(ratio of claims on the non-financial private sector to total domestic credit excluding 
credit to money banks), PRIVY (claims on non-financial private sector to GDP), and 
BANK (ratio of deposit money bank domestic assets to deposit money bank domestic 
assets plus central bank assets)  are constructed following King and Levine (1993). 
Besides, we also use credit flow to the private sector to GDP ratio (CREDIT) since it 
directly captures the effects of credit rationing on private investment. All the data series 
required for the construction of financial development indicators are obtained from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) published by the IMF. Likewise, data on real 
GDP, consumer price index (CPI), and nominal exchange rate (bilateral exchange rate 
with the US dollar) are also extracted from the IFS. 
Heterogeneity in fundamentals 
Table 1 presents some summary statistics of our dataset. They reveal important cross-
country differences in various macroeconomic aggregates. The sample-wide average 
real (at 2000 prices) per capita income is USD2,496 dollars; however, the cross-country 
variation in per capita income is tremendous. Malawi and Ecuador appear at the bottom 
with a per capita income of USD132 and USD151 dollars whereas Barbados and 
Argentina appear at the top with per capita incomes of USD7,000 or above. India and 
Kenya have a per capita income of less than USD400 dollars. The growth rate is also 
pervasive across the sample of countries. The cross-country mean rate of growth of real 
per capita income over the sample period is 1.73 percent. However, three countries 
(Guatemala, Malawi and Philippines) record negative growth rates over the sample 
period. Nine countries (Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Kenya, 
Mexico, Morocco and Uruguay) show a real per capita growth of less than one percent 
per annum. On the other hand, Belize, Grenada, Mauritius and Thailand record a real 
per capita income growth rate of above 4.0 percent. Indian and Chile show a similar real 
per capita income growth rate of 2.8 percent.   
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  GDP per capita GDP per capita  LLY  Public Inv.  Private Inv.  Inflation  Credit Flow  REX  RIR  DSer/GDP  Dstock/GDP 
  Growth  rate Mean  SD Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD Mean  SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD 
Argentina  0.04 7046  632 0.17 0.07 3.34 1.80 15.39 2.43  390  801 0.10  0.10 0.17 0.67 620 3107 4.06 2.03  43.0  15.0 
Barbados 0.67 8516  566  0.50  0.09  3.81  1.63 13.69 3.85  5  4  0.03 0.02 0.60 0.37  1  4  4.09 1.70  32.2  10.6 
Belize  5.19 1975  853  0.40  0.06 11.37 3.47 11.88 2.75  3  3  0.03  0.02 0.49 0.41  7  2  4.55 1.83  45.8  11.2 
Brazil 0.59 3139  227  0.18  0.08  5.26 1.30  15.90  1.84 563  827 0.23 0.24 0.47 0.43 810 1766 4.61 2.69  34.6  8.6 
Chile 2.82 3429  957  0.35  0.04  5.22 1.00  15.15  4.05  16  9  0.11 0.06 6.09 0.55  7  9  7.90 2.71  63.1  29.1 
Colombia 0.96 1829  189  0.18  0.03  7.59  1.08 10.19 2.45  22  6  0.04 0.02 7.38 0.53  11  6  5.48 2.13  33.9  7.2 
Costa Rica  1.05 3285  407  0.34  0.05 5.65 1.52  14.76  1.98  21  17 0.03 0.02 5.61 0.52  -4  17 7.22  4.20 70.9 40.0 
Ecuador 0.80 151  296  0.18  0.04 7.22 2.15  11.96  2.16  39  21 0.01 0.05 9.51 0.58  -9  26 7.98  2.39 80.5 21.2 
El Salvador  0.67 1777  202  0.07  0.04  3.90 1.34  10.83  2.83  14  8 0.00 0.01 2.31 0.37  0  7  3.38 0.98  34.5  6.2 
Grenada 5.02 3038  1067  0.64  0.13  14.32 10.08 18.90 9.65  5  6  0.06 0.04 0.84 0.39  0  6  2.44 0.87  46.3  7.6 
Guatemala -0.11 1554  98  0.23  0.02  3.32 1.48  10.69  2.34  13  11 0.02 0.01 1.85 0.50  -2  9  2.53 0.97  26.1  7.1 
India 2.83 333  63  0.41  0.04 8.66 1.36  12.56  2.36  9  3  0.04 0.01 3.39 0.56  7  3 1.89  0.77  22.3 6.1 
Kenya  0.78 334  28  0.34 0.06 7.67 1.35 11.57 1.14  14  10  0.03 0.02 4.18 0.49  5  9  7.11 1.67  73.2  16.3 
Malawi  -0.06 132  9  0.18 0.03 9.39 2.57 5.44 2.51  25  17 0.01 0.02 3.55 0.52  -7  11  4.91 1.72 102.9 33.6 
Malaysia 3.48 2751  741  0.69  0.14  12.73 2.63  19.97 6.32  4  2  0.10 0.06 0.90 0.49  3  2  8.01 3.73  47.8  13.3 
Mauritius 4.23 2535  713  0.57  0.14 7.77 1.77  16.75  3.52  9  8  0.06 0.03 3.01 0.49  3  4 5.39  1.65  43.1 6.9 
Mexico 0.63 5137  298  0.24  0.05 5.29 2.80  14.38  2.20  43  37 0.05 0.04 2.34 0.48  -8  18 6.55  2.07 43.8 14.0 
Morocco 0.88 1050  85  0.53  0.13  9.72  2.26 12.94 1.88  6  4  0.04 0.03 2.12 0.52  2  4  8.58 1.93  83.6  19.0 
Pakistan 1.92 427  57  0.40  0.03  8.27 1.54  8.50 0.95  8  3 0.04 0.01 3.51 0.55  0  3  3.80 1.04  48.6  5.2 
Philippines -0.02 941  59  0.37  0.13  5.11 1.94  17.07  2.91  11  10 0.04 0.05 3.53 0.48  1  7  6.24 1.41  70.6  11.9 
Thailand  4.26 1452  494 0.65 0.21 8.09 1.61 24.59 6.15  5  4  0.08  0.10 3.31 0.47  5  4  5.87 2.37  46.9  18.1 
Tunisia 1.88 1568  214  0.45  0.04  13.03  2.60 14.24 2.80  7  4  0.06 0.03 -0.11 0.50  2  4  8.28 1.49  57.3  8.2 
Turkey  2.15 2382  360 0.24 0.06 7.53 1.63 15.56 3.29  64  23  0.07  0.02 13.29 0.49  -8  24  5.42 1.91  40.6  8.6 
Uruguay  0.98 5127  722 0.40 0.06 4.34 0.85 9.24 1.80  51  30 0.13 0.07 2.57 0.55  0  14  5.18 2.25  42.0  17.6 
                               
Mean 1.734 2496.31    0.36  0.07  7.441   13.840   56.116   0.06   3.372   60.299  5.477  51.402  
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Similarly, cross-country heterogeneity is evident in private and public investment. The 
cross-country mean private investment is 13.84 percent of GDP whereas the country-
specific proportion ranges from a minimum of 5.44 percent (Malawi) to a maximum of 
24.59 percent (Thailand). The cross-country mean level of public investment is 7.44 
percent. The lowest (less than 4.0 percent) public investment is recorded by countries 
like Guatemala, Argentina, Barbados and El Salvador whereas countries like Belize, 
Granada, Malaysia and Tunisia are associated with public investment of above 10 
percent. The indicator of financial development (ratio of liquid liability of the financial 
system to GDP: LLY) also exhibits important cross-country differences. The mean 
value of LLY ranges from 0.7 percent (El Salvador) to 69 percent (Malaysia).8 The 
credit flows to the private sector as a percentage of GDP diverge between a minimum of 
1 percent (Ecuador and Malawai) to a maximum of 23 percent (Brazil). The average 
inflation also shows enormous cross-country variations. The highest inflation rate is 
recorded by Brazil (563 percent) and the lowest by Belize (3 percent). Cross-country 
heterogeneity is also apparent in real interest rate and real exchange rate movements and 
debt stocks and debt servicing (the latter two expressed as percentages of GDP). Thus, 
the panel of countries in our sample shows important divergence in their levels and 
growth of real income, levels of financial development, public investment, inflation, 
real interest rates, real exchange rates and in their magnitudes of national debt. Given 
this diversity, it is natural to expect cross-country heterogeneity in the parameters of 
private investment function—this is precisely the focus of this paper. 
3  Specification and econometric issues 
We aim to model empirically the private investment behaviour for our panel of 
countries focusing on two important issues of (i) cross-country heterogeneity in 
investment behavior, and (ii) endogeneity. We specify a general testable equation of 
private investment behaviour that incorporates most of the key arguments put forward 
by theoretical models. In this light, a typical dynamic (autoregressive) equation for 
private investment is: 
,, 1 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 4 , 1
5, 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 1 1 0 , 1 ,
pp p p g
it i t it it it it it
d
it it it it it it it
II y y I f d
r rex rexs b bs e
αγλ β β β β




=++ + + + +
++ + + + + +
  (1) 
(i= 1,…,N; and t=1,…,T) 
 
where ‘i’ and ‘t’ denote the cross-sectional and time series dimensions; αi captures the 
time-invariant unobserved country-specific fixed effects (e.g., differences in the initial 
autonomous levels of investment) and γt captures the unobservable individual-invariant 
time effects (i.e. investment shocks that are common to all countries). In equation (1) 
the dependent variable ( ,
p
it I ) is the ratio of private investment to GDP;  ,1
p
it y − denotes the 
                                                 
8 For the purpose of illustration we report only LLY. Other measures of financial development depict 
similar cross-country heterogeneity.    7




 denotes real per capita income growth;  ,
g
it I is a ratio 
of public (government) investment to GDP;  ,1 it fd − denotes the lagged indicators of 
financial development;  , it π ,  , it r ,  , it rex  and  ,
d
it rexs respectively denote inflation rate, real 
interest rate, real exchange rate and the standard deviation of real exchange rate. Finally, 
,1 it b −  and  ,1 it bs − are lagged outstanding debt stock and debt service both expressed as a 
ratio to GDP. The autoregressive parameter, λ, measures the speed of adjustment while 
βs measures the impact elasticity of   ,
p
it I with respect to all the right-hand side variables 








 are expected to exert a positive effect on ,
p
it I . This 
relationship is postulated by several variants of the flexible-accelerator model which 
assume a fixed relationship between the desired capital stock and the level of real 
output. Consequently, we expect  1 β and  2 β to be positive on a priori grounds. 
Government investment, on the one hand, may crowd-out private sector investment via 
increased deficits and a high interest rate—the well-known ‘Ricardian Equivalence 
Theorem’. On the other hand, government investment, particularly in developing 
countries, may act as crowding-in catalyst through the provision of key infrastructures 
(e.g., transport, communication and irrigation projects). Thus, at the theoretical level, 
the effect of  ,
g
it I  on  ,
p
it I  is ambiguous. A  3 0 β <  would imply crowding-out; a  3 0 β >  
means complementarity between  ,
g
it I and ,
p
it I ; and 3 0 β =  entails one effect canceling the 
other. As discussed in section 1, a voluminous theoretical and empirical literature 
documents a positive effect of various indicators of financial development and credit 
flows on the productivity of physical capital and its accumulation rate. Hence, we 
expect  4 0. β >   
 
The irreversible nature of physical capital investment is well known (see for example, 
Pindyck, 1991). Physical capital, once installed, entails substantial costs for any 
alternative (different) usage. Consequently, investors are nervous about the social, 
political, and macroeconomic uncertainties, which may jeopardize their investment and 
production plans. A high and variable inflation rate as well as the volatility of real 
exchange rate is typically used to proxy macroeconomic uncertainty in the growth 
literature. Thus, a priori, we expect  5 β  and  8 β  should resume negative signs. In 
developing countries, the effect of real interest rate on private investment is potentially 
ambiguous. Under the neoclassical model, real interest rate is one of the key 
components of the user cost of capital; therefore, it should affect private investment 
negatively. However, models of financial repression (see among others, McKinnon, 
1973; Shaw, 1973) emphasize a positive role of real interest rate on private sector 
investment in developing countries. They argue that a higher real interest rate increases 
the flow (supply) of bank credits which complements the private sector savings (which 
tend to be small and fragmented) and facilitates capital formation. Thus, 6 0 β <  would   8
imply the cost of capital effect whereas  6 0 β >  would support the ‘complementarity’ 
hypothesis; if 6 0 β = then two opposing effects cancel one another.9 A devaluation of 
exchange rate affects aggregate demand through expenditure-reducing (resulting from 
adverse real balance and real wealth effects) and expenditure-switching (emanating 
from relative price changes between domestic and foreign markets). On the demand 
side, expenditure-reducing effect will depress private investment whereas expenditure-
switching may have the opposite effect. On the supply side, the sectoral relative price 
changes may stimulate private investment in the tradable goods sector at the cost of 
non-tradable goods sector. Thus, devaluation affects private investment through several 
channels. If devaluation does not lead to a proportionate price rise then it will have a 
positive effect on private investment. However, if devaluation leads to proportionate 
inflation then it is likely to depress private investment through other channels as well. 
Thus, the effect of real exchange rate on private investment is ambiguous; hence, 
7 00 β ≤≤ . As discussed in section 1, accumulated external debt stock and debt 
servicing adversely affect private investment. A large debt stock may reduce the 
credibility of domestic economic policies and increase macroeconomic uncertainty. 
Likewise, a high debt servicing reduces resource availability for domestic investment. 
Both of these effects depress private investment; hence we expect  9 β and 10 0 β < . 
 
Specification (1) is standard in the literature. Yet, it merely allows for unobservable 
individual and time effects. All other parameters are assumed homogeneous across all 
countries in the panel. However, as pointed out above, the assumption of cross-country 
parameter homogeneity is quite strong and it is unlikely to hold. Hence, we model the 
cross-country heterogeneity in domestic private investment  behaviour by estimating the 
following model:  
, 0 , 1 1 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 1
'' ' ' '
,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,
( *)( *)( *)( *)
(* ) ( * ) ( * ) (* )
pp p p p p
it i t it i it i it i it i it
k kit k i kit k kit k i kit k i kit it
II y p I r I I f d I
X yp X r X X fd X e
αγλ λ λ λ π λ
βδ θ ϕ π φ
−− −− − =++ + + + +
++ + + + +
 (2) 
where , , ,1 , , ,1 , , , , ,1 ,1 [, , , , , , , ,, ] '
pp g d
kit it it it it it it it it it it X y y I fd r rex rexs b bs π
•










= ∑ ,, , , , (, , ,) it it it it it Wy p r f d π ∈ ; and (k= 1,…,10).  
Specification (2) is a dynamic heterogeneous panel model which allows slope 
parameters and the adjustment dynamics (λj) of private investment function to differ 
across countries.10 Country-specific parameters are linearly related to the country-
specific mean levels of per capita income, real interest rate, inflation and financial 
                                                 
9 It should also be noted however that Keynesians have complained about the very weak cost of capital 
effect even for developed economies. 
10 See Pesaran et al. (2000: 53-82) for the theoretical development and empirical implementation of this 
approach. Specification (2) is not motivated by time-varying parameters; instead, it is assumed that the 
slope coefficients in each country are fixed over time but vary across countries linearly with  i W .   9
development. At the estimation stage, (see Section 4) we use different measures of 
financial development. 
 
Since all the potential determinants of private investment specified in equation (1) 
exhibit important differences across the sample of countries (see Section 2), 
conceptually, they all can be candidates for explaining the cross-country heterogeneity 
in productivity parameters. However, in our specification we allow diversity in only 
four key variables, namely, the mean values (levels) of real per capita income ( i yp ), 
real interest rate ( i r ) inflation ( i π ) and the indicators of financial development ( i fd ) to 
enter into the model. This is done with a view to keep the model tractable. If the mean 
values of all the potential determinants (ten in total) are to be allowed then our 
unrestricted model will have one hundred and ten parameters. However, concentrating 
on only four key macroeconomic variables leaves us with 50 unrestricted parameters 
and thus circumvents from over-parameterisation of the model. 
 








k φ = 0 holds for 








k φ ≠0 for j=1,..,4; then 
the relationship is heterogeneous in slope parameters but homogeneous in adjustment 








k φ ≠0, holds true then the relationship is 
heterogeneous in all parameters. From (2) the vector of the country-specific parameters 
can be obtained as:  
12 3 4 5 (* )(* )(*)(* ) ii i i i yp r fd ζζ ζ ζ ζπ ζ =+ + + +      (3) 
where  [,,,,,] ' jkk kk k ζ λ β δθϕφ = .       
Econometric issues 
Three issues prominently feature in the estimation of equation (2). These are: (i) the 
potential endogeneity due to the joint determination of some of the right- and left-hand-
side variables; (ii) inertia (a common phenomenon in annual macroeconomic time series 
which may cause bias and imprecision of the estimated parameters); and (iii) 
measurement errors. The system GMM estimator addresses these estimation issues and 
appears best suited for our purpose. 
 
For a brief illustration of GMM, we rewrite equation (2) by suppressing the interaction 
terms for simplicity but without loss of its generality, as:  
,, 1 , , it i t it it it y yXv α γ λ ξ − =++ + +              (4) 
where yit denotes  ,
p
it I ;   , , ,1 , , ,1 , , , , ,1 ,1 [, , , , , , , ,, ]
pp g d
kit it it it it it it it it it it X y y I fd r rex rexs b bs π
•
−− − − =  and 
' k ξβ = . If ( ) it is Evv = 0 holds for s≠t across all ‘i’, then the following moment 
conditions are valid (see Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen 1988; and Arellano and Bond 
1991):  
E(yi,t-s Δvit)=0     for s≥2;   t= 3,…, T.             (5) 
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Furthermore, if Xit are weakly exogenous then the following additional moment 
conditions are also valid: 
E(Xi,t-s Δvi,t)=0    for s≥2;   t= 3,…, T.            (6) 
The difference GMM estimator exploits the above moment conditions and uses the 
lagged (two periods or more) levels of endogenous and weakly exogenous variables of 
the model as instruments to address endogeneity.11 However, when data are persistent 
and the time-series dimension is moderately short, the difference estimator suffers from 
the problem of weak instruments. Internally generated instruments and the regressors 
tend to be poorly correlated. Consequently, estimates suffer from large finite sample 
biases and poor precision (see among others, Ahn and Schmidt, 1995 and Staiger and 
Stock, 1997). However, the system GMM estimator due to Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998) considerably reduces the biases and imprecision 
associated with the difference GMM estimator.  
 
The system GMM estimator estimates a system of equations in the first differences and 
levels. It pools (T-s) transformed (first difference) equations with an additional set of 
(T-s) level equations (note s ≥ 2). The first difference specification uses the suitably 
lagged levels as instruments whereas the level equations utilize the suitably lagged first 
differences as instruments. The latter’s validity is based on the following moment 
conditions:  
 
E[(αi,t + vi,t) Δyi,t-s] = 0 for s=1              (7) 
E[(αi,t + vi,t) ΔXi,t-s] = 0  for s = 1               (8) 
 
The validity of the set of instruments used as well as the absence of residual serial 
correlation are key to the consistency of GMM estimators. We perform Sargan’s 
instruments validity test and the Difference-Sargan test to establish the validity of the 
instruments used. A second-order serial correlation test is performed to check residual 
serial correlation.  
4 Empirical  results 
As a precursor, in Table 2 we report the results obtained from a typical first-order-
autoregressive panel data model that allows for the fixed-effect and individual invariant 
time effects. This is an extensively used approach in the panel literature and it allows us 
to compare our results with those in the literature. Results in the first column show that 
the standard variables that economic theory postulates to affect private investment are 
indeed significant. The growth rate of per capita income positively and significantly 
explains private investment whereas the lagged level of per capita income appears 
                                                 
11 The first difference specification gets rid of the fixed effects. However, other equally valid 
transformations include mean deviation and/or orthogonal deviations (see Arellano and Bond 1991). 
Equation (2) uses mean deviations.    11
positive but marginally fails significance at 10 per cent. Public investment appears 
significantly negative which supports the crowding-out hypothesis. Inflation, as 
expected, is negatively signed and significant. The coefficients of real interest rate and 
real exchange rate appear negatively signed but insignificant; consistent with the 
theoretical predictions that their effect may be ambiguous. The level of debt stock 
significantly reduces private investment for this panel of countries but debt service 
appears insignificant. The second and third columns augment the basic model (column 
1) with measures of financial development. Only two measures of financial 
development, credit flows to private sector and BANK, appear significant. However, 
results in the last column show that credit flows dominate the BANK.12 The 
significance of credit flows to private sector also indicates that private investment may 
be credit rationed in these economies. The results show significant fixed and time 
effects. Tests of the first and second order residual serial correlation reveal that residuals 
are serially uncorrelated. Overall, these results broadly echo the findings reported 
elsewhere in the literature. 
 
However, results of the models reported in Table 2 do not capture cross-country 
heterogeneity; nor they address endogeneity. Table 3 reports the results obtained from 
our dynamic heterogeneous panel model specified in equation (2). We report results 
based on three different estimators, namely, the dynamic heterogeneous OLS, the 
single-equation GMM, and the system GMM in order to gauge the robustness of our 
results. In sharp contrast to the fixed-effect estimates of Table 2, regressors interacted 
with country-specific mean values appear highly significant in almost all cases. Thus, 
these results reject the homogeneity of slope coefficients and adjustment dynamics 
across all the sample countries. All the coefficients associated with the key determinants 
of private investment behaviour show significant cross-country variations. The 
parameters of private investment functions are country-specific and they systematically 
depend on the country-specific macroeconomic conditions such as the levels of real 
income, inflation, real interest rate, bank credit flows to the private sector and the levels 
of financial development. Our results also reveal that the cross-country adjustment 
dynamics of private investment depends on the levels of real income, real interest rate 
and the bank credit flows to the private sector. The signs of the estimated parameters 
suggest that relatively rich countries and countries with a developed financial system 
tend to show quicker adjustment of private investment behaviour. However, higher real 
interest rate appears to slow down the rate of adjustment. The latter may be due to the 




                                                 
12  Other measures of financial development employed in the paper, i.e. LLY, PRIVATE and PRIVY, do 
not appear to be significant. Our results seem to indicate that it is the flow of credit to the private sector 
which is crucial for private sector investment. This finding is interesting because all countries in our 
sample are developing countries where capital markets play little role in raising equity capital.   12
Table 2: The fixed effects panel estimates 
Specification:  ,, 1 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 4 , 1
5, 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 1 1 0 , 1 ,
pp p p g
it i t it it it it it
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II y y I f d
r rex rexs b bs e
αγλ β β β β
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αi (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
γt (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
R
2 0.873  0.877  0.874  0.877 
σ 2.026  2.001  2.024  2.002 
AR(1) (0.421)  0.454  0.422  0.445 
AR(2) (0.230)  0.402  0.256  0.444 
Observations 464 464  464  464 
Note: (.) are p-values. AR(1) and AR(2) are first and second order LM tests of residual correlations. In this 
and subsequent tables ‘cr ‘ and ‘bn ‘ respectively denote the CREDIT and BANK measures of financial 
development. 
 
It is interesting to note that countries with high levels of per capita income and high real 
interest rate tend to show a large marginal effect of real income (per capita) on private   13
investment. Thus, the real income effect on private investment appears heterogeneous 
across rich and poor countries. However, the income effect appears to dwindle when 
countries suffer from a high rate of inflation. Likewise, the marginal effect of real 
income growth on private investment increases with a higher level of per capita income 
but it lessens with higher inflation. Thus, our results suggest that the effects of the 
income and real income growth on private investment are closely linked to the levels of 
income, real interest rate and inflation of the country concerned and the relevant 
parameters are country specific. 
 
Real interest rate is another important determinant of private investment. However, the 
effect of real interest rate on private investment is also country specific and depends on 
the level of real income (proxied by ,1
p
it y − ) and financial development (proxied by credit 
flows to GDP ratio to the private sector). We find that the level of real interest appears 
to support the ‘complementarity’ hypothesis in developing countries because the 
coefficient of real interest rate ( , /
p
it I r ∂∂ ) is significantly positive. Moreover, a higher 
real interest rate appears to increase private investment because  , /* 0
p
ii t Ir r ∂∂ > . 
Interestingly, however, when these countries acquire higher level of income (
p
i y ) and 
higher financial development ( i cf ) the neoclassical effect becomes significant (the real 
interest rate resumes significantly negative coefficient when interacted with 
p
i y  and 
i cf ). Thus, our results indicate that for the low-income countries the ‘complementarity’ 
hypothesis may apply but for the middle income countries the neoclassical  prediction 
appears more consistent. 
 
Public investment significantly reduces private investment and the extent of crowding 
out effect appears directly related with the country specific level of real income. 
Countries with higher real per capita income experience more crowding out and vice 
versa. We find that inflation significantly reduces private investment and a higher level 
of inflation magnifies this perverse effect; thus, the inflation effect is also country 
specific. Results show that debt stock affects private investment negatively and the 
magnitude of this effect appears to depend on the level of financial development. We 
find that the negative impact of debt stock on private investment increases with the level 
of financial development. This may indicate the information processing and signal 
extraction capacity of financial development. Surprisingly we do not find statistically 
significant effect of debt service to GDP ratio. Finally, financial development exerts 
significantly positive effect on private investment in sample countries. The effect of 
financial development on private investment is country-specific whereby the magnitude 
of the effect tends to increase when countries become more financially developed. The 
qualitative nature of our results is robust to all three estimators and the estimated models 
pass diagnostic checks. Tests for the first and second-order residual serial correlation 
suggest that residuals are well behaved. Sargan tests confirm the validity of the 
instruments in both GMM models. The fixed and time effects appear significant. 
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Table 3: The dynamic heterogeneous panel estimates 
, 0 , 1 1 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 1
'' ' ' '
,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,
( *)( *)( *)( *)
( *) ( *)( *) ( *)
pp p p p p
it i t it i it i it i it i it
k kit k i kit k kit k i kit k i kit it
II y p I r I I f d I
Xy p X r X X f d X e
αγλ λ λ λ π λ
βδ θ ϕ π φ
−− −− − =++ + + + +
++ + + + +
 
 OLS  GMM-Single  equation  System-GMM 
Constant 5.446(0.777)  4.739 (0.801)  1.159 (0.967) 
, it r   0.113(0.000)*** 0.085  (0.005)** 0.064  (0.020)** 
, it rex   6.823e-006(0.00)*** -  - 
, it π   -0.002(0.001)*** -0.002(0.002)*** -0.003  (0.005)** 
i yp * ,1
p
it I −   0.060(000)*** 0.053(0.000)*** 0.052(0.002)*** 
r * ,1
p
it I −   -0.001(0.000)*** -0.001(0.000)*** -0.001(0.000)*** 
i cr * ,1
p
it I −   2.980(0.018)** 3.491(0.011)** 3.552(0.021)** 
,1 *
p
ii t ypy −   0.184(0.051)** 0.211(0.02)** 0.224(0.010)** 
,1 *
p
ii t ry −   0.011(0.085)* 0.014(0.034)** 0.014(0.036)** 
,1 *
p
ii t y π −   -0.020(0.058)* -0.022(0.030)** -0.024(0.013)** 
, * ii t yp yp
•
 
2.044(0.000)*** 2.199(0.003)*** 2.246(0.004)*** 
, * ii t yp π
•
 
-0.048(0.063)* -0.059(0.062)* -0.048(0.057)* 
, * ii t rr   0.031(0.007)*** -  - 
, * ii t cr r   -0.165(0.001)*** -0.059(0.005)** -0.045(0.021)** 
, * ii t yp r   -0.014(0.000)*** -0.009(0.005)** -0.007(0.020)** 
, *
g
it yp I   -0.032(0.000)*** -0.040(0.000)*** -0.043(0.000)*** 
,1 * it ππ −   -0.008(0.000) -0.008(0.000)*** -3.454(0.000)*** 
,1 * ii t bn b −   -0.030(0.029)** -0.029(0.044)** -0.030(0.036)** 
,1 * it bn bn −   3.949(0.015)** 4.207(0.044)** 4.724(0.025)** 
,1 * it cr cr −   53.386(0.000)*** 54.628(0.001)*** 54.562(0.000)*** 
      
αI  (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
γt  (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
R
2 0.892***  -  - 
σ  1.892 1.907  1.916 
AR(1) 0.466  0.466  0.153 
table continues…   15
AR(2) 0.872  0.872  0.520 
Sargan -  2 χ [1532]=340.1  - 
Diff-Sargan -  -  2 χ [153]=33.6 
Observations 468  468  468 
Note: Numbers in (.) indicate p-values. 
 
Table 4: Country specific parameters system GMM (elasticities) 
 
i λ   i r  
g
i I   i π   i b   i bn   i cr  
p
i y   i yp
•
 
Argentina  0.209  -0.109 -0.083 -1.326 -0.058 0.148  0.038 0.616 1.137 
Barbados  0.571 0.000 -0.108  -0.015 -0.063 0.271  0.003 0.140 1.468 
Belize  0.506 0.005 -0.312  -0.007 -0.097 0.282  0.005 0.145 1.422 
Brazil  0.417  -0.132 -0.115 -1.283 -0.030 0.064  0.178 0.751 0.986 
Chile  0.801 0.001 -0.121  -0.139 0.000  0.000  0.042 0.102 1.156 
Colombia  0.506 0.011 -0.241  -0.398 -0.005 0.001  0.007 0.128 1.551 
Costa  Rica  0.545  -0.001 -0.133 -0.257 -0.031 0.015  0.004 0.084 1.162 
Ecuador  0.288  -0.022 -0.130 -1.058 -0.127 0.157  0.000 0.004 0.784 
El  Salvador  0.403 0.000 -0.116  -0.150 -0.058 0.162 0.000 0.123 1.490 
Granada  0.621 0.000 -0.261  -0.010 -0.065 0.196  0.010 0.089 0.941 
Guatemala 0.461  -0.003 -0.098 -0.133 -0.056  0.258 0.002 0.122 1.485 
India  0.420 0.012 -0.172  -0.055 -0.003 0.001  0.005 0.094 1.004 
Kenya  0.406 0.009 -0.166  -0.149 -0.142 0.227  0.004 0.089 1.068 
Malawi  0.306  -0.037 -0.362 -0.911 -0.328 0.289  0.002 0.075 1.798 
Malaysia  0.746 0.001 -0.217  -0.006 -0.068 0.215  0.025 0.087 0.882 
Mauritius  0.611 0.001 -0.156  -0.042 -0.064 0.192  0.011 0.094 1.025 
Mexico  0.627  -0.001 -0.135 -0.386 -0.077 0.233  0.009 0.082 1.248 
Morocco  0.501 0.002 -0.225  -0.023 -0.137 0.183  0.007 0.112 1.186 
Pakistan  0.442 0.001 -0.253  -0.069 -0.110 0.230  0.008 0.137 1.555 
Philippines  0.500 0.001 -0.088  -0.064 -0.015 0.004  0.005 0.075 0.869 
Thailand  0.658 0.002 -0.103  -0.010 -0.001 0.000  0.014 0.064 0.655 
Tunisia  0.590 0.002 -0.290  -0.026 -0.107 0.261  0.013 0.107 1.138 
Turkey  0.674  -0.003 -0.162 -1.311 -0.056 0.154  0.019 0.028 0.968 
Uruguay  0.903 0.000 -0.172  -2.289 -0.083 0.188  0.099 0.075 1.812 
Mean  0.523  -0.011 -0.176 -0.421 -0.074 0.155  0.021 0.143 1.200 
SD  0.163 0.035 0.077 0.609 0.069 0.102 0.039 0.171 0.310 
Note: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Turkey historically had very high rates of inflation, however, in recent 
years they have come down. Latin American countries in particular have significantly improved their 
inflation records in recent years. The reported inflation elasticities for Argentina, Brazil and Turkey are 
computed at the mean inflation rate of 50 percent; for Mexico it is 26 percent. Deletion of some major 
inflation outliers gives a mean inflation rate of these magnitudes for these countries. The use of unadjusted 
mean inflation rates produces huge negative point elasticity of inflation for these four countries. Note that 
we do not adjust inflation series in any of our estimations.  
Source: Obtained from the estimates of Table 3. 
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Table 5: Country specific parameters (OLS elasticities) 
  Lamda r  I
g  i π   i b   i bn   i cr  
p
i y   i yp
•
 
Argentina 0.829 0.185 -0.060  -1.297 -0.055 0.119  0.036 0.005 0.310 
Barbados 0.627 0.000 -0.078  -0.014 -0.059 0.217  0.003 0.103 0.511 
Belize 0.546  0.118  -0.225  -0.006 -0.092 0.226  0.005 0.113 0.498 
Brazil 1.149  0.173  -0.083  -1.255  -0.029  0.052 0.167 -0.004  0.259 
Chile 0.803  0.101  -0.087  -0.135  0.000 0.000 0.040 0.068 0.380 
Colombia 0.543 0.391 -0.174  -0.388 -0.004 0.001  0.006 0.078 0.487 
Costa Rica  0.591  0.032  -0.096  -0.250 -0.030 0.012  0.004 0.041 0.370 
Ecuador 0.327  0.186  -0.094  -1.034 -0.120 0.126  0.000 -0.053  0.183 
El Salvador  0.461  0.000  -0.084  -0.146 -0.055 0.130 0.000 0.075 0.491 
Granada 0.652  0.000  -0.188  -0.009 -0.062 0.157  0.009 0.065 0.327 
Guatemala 0.508  0.015  -0.071 -0.129 -0.053 0.207 0.002 0.073 0.492 
India 0.445  0.128  -0.124  -0.054 -0.003 0.001  0.005 0.067 0.335 
Kenya 0.434  0.079  -0.119  -0.145 -0.134 0.182  0.004 0.054 0.343 
Malawi 0.339  0.217  -0.261  -0.888 -0.310 0.232  0.002 -0.021  0.507 
Malaysia 0.755  0.013  -0.157  -0.005 -0.065 0.172  0.023 0.066 0.308 
Mauritius 0.640  0.015  -0.113  -0.041 -0.060 0.154  0.010 0.066 0.348 
Mexico 0.669  0.147  -0.097  -0.377 -0.073 0.187  0.009 0.031 0.391 
Morocco 0.533  0.011  -0.162  -0.022 -0.130 0.147  0.006 0.081 0.408 
Pakistan 0.469  0.002  -0.183  -0.066 -0.105 0.184  0.008 0.091 0.524 
Philippines 0.531  0.004  -0.064 -0.063 -0.014 0.003  0.005 0.048 0.289 
Thailand 0.670  0.033  -0.074  -0.009 -0.001 0.000  0.013 0.048 0.226 
Tunisia 0.615  0.011  -0.209  -0.025 -0.101 0.209  0.013 0.077 0.391 
Turkey 0.696  0.126  -0.117  -1.282 -0.053 0.123  0.018 -0.031  0.251 
Uruguay 0.897  -0.001  -0.124  -2.239 -0.078 0.150  0.093 -0.023  0.483 
Mean 0.614  0.083  -0.127  -0.412  -0.070 0.125  0.020 0.047 0.380 
SD  0.814 0.098 0.056 0.595 0.065 0.082 0.037 0.045 0.101 
Source: Obtained from the estimates of Table 3. 
 
Parameters in Table 3 are semi-elasticities hence interpretation of their magnitude is not 
straightforward. In Table 4 we report the country-specific parameters (elasticities) 
associated with each of the significant regressor reported in Table 3 under the System 
GMM approach (country-specific parameters associated with OLS elasticities are also 
reported in Table 5). These country specific parameters are calculated by using the 
methodology set out in equation (3).  We also report the cross-sectional mean and 
standard deviation of the country specific parameters. Although our results are robust to 
different estimators, our focus on the system GMM estimator is due to its superiority 
over other estimators. Country-specific parameters show positive effect of real income 
and income growth for all countries in the sample. This is consistent with the priori 
expectation and findings elsewhere. What is revealing is the cross-country variations in 
the parameters of  ,
p
it y  and  , it yp
•
. The elasticity of private investment with respect to real 
per capita income ranges between a minimum of 0.004 (Ecuador) to a maximum of   17
0.751 (Brazil); the cross-country mean is 0.143. The elasticity of private investment 
with respect to real per capita income growth ranges between 0.784 (Ecuador) to 1.812 
(Uruguay). Two indicators of financial development (CREDIT and BANK) positively 
affect private sector investment but the cross-country parameters are profoundly 
divergent. The point elasticity of BANK varies between 0.001 (e.g., India) to 0.289 
(Malawi) whereas the point elasticity of CREDIT diverges between 0.001(El Salvador) 
to 0.178 (Brazil). The elasticity of private investment with respect to debt stock, 
inflation and public investment are uniformly negative for all countries however cross-
country variations in parameters are apparent. The estimates of point elasticity vis-à-vis 
real interest rate are quite interesting. For eight countries we find a negative effect of 
real interest rate on private investment (consistent with neoclassical model) and for the 
rest the point elasticity is positive (consistent with the complementarity effect). The 
overall panel mean is -0.011. The country-specific parameters of lagged dependent 
variable also exhibit tremendous variation and hence a different speed of adjustment. 
5 Concluding  remarks 
In this paper, we examined the domestic private investment behaviour of a panel of 24 
low-income and middle-income countries spanning a period of 1981-2000. We 
rigorously address two important issues—(i) the cross-country heterogeneity in private 
investment behaviour, and (ii) endogeneity—that have remained largely overlooked by 
previous empirical studies of private investment behaviour.  
 
Financial sector development (measured by various indicators) and other standard 
macroeconomic determinants of private investment appear significant in explaining 
private investment behaviour in our sample. However, the estimated parameters and 
adjustment dynamics exhibit important cross-country differences. More precisely, our 
empirical results clearly suggest that the parameters of private investment functions are 
country-specific and they systematically depend on the country-specific macroeconomic 
conditions such as the levels of real income, inflation, real interest rate, and the levels of 
financial development. Our findings also indicate that the effect of real income and 
income growth on private investment is closely linked to the levels of income, real 
interest rate and inflation of the country concerned; and hence these parameters are 
country specific. We also found that the level of real interest appears to support the 
‘complementarity’ hypothesis in the case of developing countries provided they are 
characterized by low level of inflation. For high inflation countries, we find a negative 
point elasticity of real interest rate on private investment. Furthermore, our estimates 
seem to confirm the crowding-out relationship between public and private investment 
and that the extent of crowding-out effect appears directly related to the country specific 
level of real income - high income countries experience more crowding-out and vice 
versa. We find that inflation significantly reduces private investment but a higher level 
of inflation magnifies this effect. The inflation effect is also country specific. Our 
results show that the debt stock affects private investment negatively and the magnitude   18
of this effect appears to depend on the level of financial development that each country 
has acquired; this is consistent with the information gathering and processing capacity 
of a developed financial system. Surprisingly, however, we do not find a statistically 
significant effect of debt service to GDP ratio on private investment. Finally, we find 
that financial sector development has a significantly positive effect on private 
investment in our sample countries; and this effect is country-specific whereby the 
magnitude of the effect tends to be positively associated with the level of financial 
development. Our results are robust to a range of estimators used and the estimated 
models perform well vis-à-vis the key misspecification diagnostics.  
 
Two important implications arise from our analysis. First, the cross-country 
heterogeneity is an acutely important facet of private investment behaviour and it must 
be addressed. Second, at the policy level, the country-specific approach appears 
potentially more effective than the one-size-fits-all approach for boosting private 
investment.  
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